Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 4-10, 55-85 (2002) (statement and prepared statement of David Getches, professor, University of Colorado at Boulder, School, CO).
RULINGS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AS THEY AFFECT THE POWERS AND THE INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

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SECOND SESSION
ON
CONCERNS OF RECENT DECISIONS OF THE U.S SUPREME COURT AND THE FUTURE OF INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN AMERICA

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(ii)
CONTENTS

Statements:
Allen, W. Ron, chairman, Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe, Sequim, WA .......... 30
Anderson, Robert, University of Washington, School of Law, Seattle, WA . 10
Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from Colorado, vice chair-
man, Committee on Indian Affairs ........................................... 2
Canby, Jr., William C., senior judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Phoenix, AZ ........................................................... 19
Getches, David, professor, University of Colorado at Boulder, School,
CO ......................................................................................... 4
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, chairman, Committee
on Indian Affairs ....................................................................... 1
St. Clair, John, chief justice, Supreme Court, Wind River Reservation,
Ft. Washakie, WY ...................................................................... 28
Yazzie, Robert, chief justice, Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Window
Rock, AZ .................................................................................. 26

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
Allen, W. Ron .............................................................................. 51
Anderson, Robert .......................................................................... 40
Canby, Jr., William C. .................................................................... 44
Cantwell, Hon. Maria, U.S. Senator from Washington ......................... 39
Getches, David (with attachments) ................................................... 55
St. Clair, John ................................................................................ 43
Yazzie, Robert ............................................................................... 86
In short, I feel, if left unchecked, the philosophy and reasoning of the Supreme Court cases will mean that in fairly short order Indian tribes will be left with very little, if any, powers at all. If this trend continues, the current vigor of Indian tribal governments will be a distant memory, and the tribes themselves will become little more than social clubs or mechanisms for funding Federal dollars to Indian people.

The advances of rehabilitating tribal economies will be reversed if tribes lack fundamental authority over people and events that are located on their lands. Massive refederalization on Indian issues will take place, which is not healthy for the tribes, for tribal members, or local citizens, or the taxpayer. This result is not, in my view, what the U.S. Constitution sets out envisioned, and does not represent the views of, I believe, the majority on this committee or in Congress generally.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be included in the record, and I look forward to the hearing with our witnesses today.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Today we are honored to have the greatest legal minds of this land on matters involved in Indian affairs. For the first panel I call upon Professor David Getches, of the University of Colorado at Boulder, School of Law, and Professor Robert Anderson, of the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle.

STATEMENT OF DAVID GETCHES, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER, SCHOOL OF LAW, BOULDER, CO

Mr. GETCHES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Campbell. It is a pleasure to be here, and I am pleased to have an opportunity to talk about an issue of extreme importance to those of us who have been involved in Indian law for many years, and certainly to all people of Indian country.

The current U.S. Supreme Court has made an astounding shift in its Indian law jurisprudence. It has disregarded 170 years of Supreme Court precedent. It has undermined the congressional policy of political and economic self-determination for Indians, and these decisions affect the lives of every reservation Indian, making reservation life less secure and reservation futures less promising.

Now the travesty of mismanaged Indian trust funds is well-known, but the Supreme Court's assault on the foundations of Indian law and on congressionally-mandated Indian policy is virtually unknown outside Indian country, but the effects of the Supreme Court's actions promise to be deeper and longer lasting.

Now I've been a student and a teacher and a practitioner of Indian law for over 30 years now. In the nineties we have witnessed a sea change in Indian law. We have found that Indian law in the Supreme Court is heading in a radical new direction.

I began researching why this was several years ago. I did this reading painstakingly all the opinions of the Court and then spending a summer here at the Library of Congress going through the files that had been made available by the late Justice Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall. The first revelation I had in looking at these records was that the internal memos showed that for some Justices on the Supreme Court Indian law was seen as a field with
no anchors, with no guiding principles, or moorings. The memos, internal, private memos, showed an unabashed concern with setting things right in Indian country, with taking to task the decisions of the past, and applying the present values of these Justices, as if the opinions of the past had been grounded in no principles at all.

As your statement, Mr. Chairman, and the statements of Senator Campbell indicated, those earlier opinions were, indeed, grounded in long tradition of Supreme Court precedent, going back to the early 1800s and the decisions in three major cases by Chief Justice John Marshall.

Now it became clear to me as I proceeded in this research that majorities of the Court were deciding cases in order to reach outcomes that satisfied them without basing their decisions on the precedents and principles that had guided their predecessors for 170 years. But other than the fact that the whole exercise was subjective, as I indicated in a 1996 article, I couldn't find any new philosophy or set of principles that gave coherence to the Court's decisions.

Eventually, I turned my attention to the work of constitutional scholars and looked beyond my own expertise in Indian law and found in the full array of cases, the cases going well beyond Indian law, that there were three themes or trends that explained nearly every decision of the Court since the mid-1980's, not just in Indian law. They describe a set of values that the majorities favor, and these values are not specific to Indian law. The three value-based trends are, first, a commitment to the rights of states; second, a belief that the law must be colorblind, and, third, a desire to support mainstream values.

Now each of these trends sweeps with them nearly every Indian case. As I am sure is obvious to the members of the committee, States are adverse to Indians in nearly every Indian case in the Supreme Court. Colorblind justice may stand for principles that are important to members of the Court in affirmative action settings, but Indian laws are not about affirmative action. That's about a government-to-government relationship.

Mainstream values, Indians may have lifestyles and religions that are different, but it's not the same as the perception of being “out of step” that the Court might see in other contexts. These trends are robust, accounting for the Court's outcomes in virtually every case. I would like to offer today this article that does the analysis. I expect that, in the interest of time, we ought not to go over all 80 pages of this very interesting article, but I will offer it for the committee and your record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be part of the record.

Mr. GETCHES. Now when you look at the work of the Court since the mid-1980's, the most striking reality is that Indians lose. On the chart that I have put up here, you can see the blue lines stand for cases, or rather percentages of cases, in each term of the Court since 1958 to the term 2000–2001. The red lines stand for percentages of losses. As you can see, the red lines are much more prevalent at the more recent end of the chart. The black is a trend line showing the trend of decisions, a trend against Indians.
Now if, for purposes of comparison, it is helpful to look at other courts, what I have done is compared the Rehnquist Court, which really began in 1986, with its predecessor, the Burger Court. This pie charts show that in the Burger Court, Indians were winning 58 percent of the cases. In the Rehnquist Court, almost equal number of terms of Court, Indian tribes are winning on 23 percent of the cases that come before the Court.

Now the differences here are striking. In trying to understand what is going on here, I ask myself, is this extraordinary or are there other groups of litigants, other types of interests, or other subject matters of cases, where litigants have done as badly as Indians. I looked at possibilities ranging from immigration to criminal cases, and the worst record I found for any litigants other than Indians was convicted criminals seeking reversals of their convictions. I found that convicted criminals won 34 percent of the time while Indian tribes have won only 23 percent of the time. Nobody does worse in this Supreme Court than Indian tribes.

These decisions are not only bad on a win/loss ratio. These decisions are major departures from Indian law as it was developed and articulated by the Court from the very foundings of this Nation until the 1980’s. The basic rules were straightforward. You mentioned the foundational principles and cases in your statement, Mr. Chairman. The foundation principles are summarized here. Tribes are sovereigns. Tribes became subject to the legislative power of the United States and lost their external sovereignty by being incorporated into the United States, but retained tribal powers can only be qualified by congressional legislation or treaties. This is laid out in the Marshall trilogy, those three leading cases from the early 1800’s.

Now not all of these principles have always pleased Indian tribes. The Indian law scholars, Indian tribal leaders and their attorneys have not liked the idea that, just by virtue of planting an American flag on the shore of North America, the right to squelch and diminish tribal powers was gained by the Europeans. But, be that as it may, this doctrine of plenary congressional power has been reiterated by the courts, and tribes have learned to live with it.

They have learned that it can be a barrier against the intrusion of State governments into their territories. Tribes have also suffered under this plenary power doctrine. Congress has not always been generous with Indian tribes.

For instance, tribes suffered enormous losses when Congress embraced the allotment policy in the 1800’s, the late 1800’s, and the purpose there was to break up reservation lands, tribal lands, and distribute small parcels to every individual Indian, so that the remaining land could be distributed to homesteaders. This policy proved to be an abject disaster. Congress recognized that, but not for almost 50 years. Eventually, Congress reversed the policy with the Indian Reorganization Act policies that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.

Now the ensuing period was more benign, but then again in the 1950’s Congress went astray, if I may say, and abruptly changed the course of Indian policy. Termination became the policy of that era. The idea was to end the Federal relationship with the tribes.
of the United States and divide up the property of the tribes, again assimilating.

Now this took an enormous toll on 100 Indian tribes, but the courts didn't alter it. The courts didn't alter the allotment policy. The courts deferred to Congress. It was Congress that reversed again the termination policy after 15 years of failure. It took 20 years to make things right and restore tribes to their original status; that Congress did, but without any encouragement from the courts.

Now since then tribal governments have rebuilt. Some are strong, healthy governments. Others are struggling to overcome a myriad of disadvantages. Congress has decided to support tribes in their successes and allow them their occasional missteps. Tribes have begun to find their footing, and their cultures, bruised by ill-considered policies of the past, are gaining new strength.

During the last 30 years of its self-determination policy, Congress has passed dozens of bills to support the ideal of self-determination, and those bills are enumerated, or many of them, in the footnotes to my written testimony that I submitted earlier. Bills, great pieces of legislation, like the Indian Self-Determination Act, the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the list is very long, and it's a tribute to the work of this committee and to the unflagging policy of Congress during this period.

Meanwhile, the Rehnquist Court has decided case after case against the very principles and policies that the Congress has sought to advance. Instead of recognizing the will of Congress, the Court has strained to give effect today to the policies of yesterday. The allotment policy, for instance, has been a dominant force in the decisions of the current Court.

The Court has prevented tribes from trying non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation. It's prevented tribes from regulating non-members hunting and fishing on the reservation. It's prevented tribes from zoning non-members' lands in parts of some reservations. It's prevented tribes from taxing guests in hotels on the reservation, and it's prevented tribal courts from hearing personal injury lawsuits by non-Indians who want to use the tribal courts, and from hearing suits by Indians who have tried to sue non-Indians in tribal court for torts committed against them in their homes on reservation lands owned by the tribe.

Now just compare how the Rehnquist Court looks at these issues of tribal sovereignty and powers. I have put up here some quotes from the earlier Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court. On tribal powers, the modern era Burger Court said:

Until Congress acts, the tribe retains existing powers of sovereignty. That's the law as it has always been.

A 1997 case, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, our case law establishes that, absent express authorization by Federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction exists only in limited circumstances, an exact shift in position.

Tribal sovereignty, what did the Court say up until the mid-eighties? Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of non-members. Non-members' presence and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the limitations tribes choose to impose. That was
the law until the mid-eighties. The 2001 case of Atkinson Trading Company said that Indian tribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.

Look at the shift with respect to tribal courts. In 1987, Iowa Mutual, civil jurisdiction over non-member activities presumptively lies in tribal courts. 2001, Justice Souter concurring in the Hicks case says:

A presumption against tribal court civil jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant:

The earlier criminal jurisdiction case.

What does the present Court say about congressional intent compared to its predecessors? How do they look on the policies of this Congress? In the modern era, the period up until the mid-1980's, the Court said things like this in Bryan v. Itasca County:

Courts are not obligated in ambiguous circumstances to strain to implement an assimilationist policy Congress has now rejected.

Look at what the Court now says. In the Brendale case, it said that:

When an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government, we can find no tribal jurisdiction.

You see, the Court in the 1970's not ready to look back at repudiated policies of Congress, and you see the Court in 1989 looking farther backward to the allotment policy as its touchstone for its decisions.

Now let's look at a couple of these recent cases and what their impacts are. The Brendale case, which I just quoted, involved two non-Indian landowners on the reservations. Both of them wanted to build multi-unit housing developments on the Yakima Reservation. Now the tribe, the Yakima Nation, has for many years had its own zoning laws. Later on the county adopted its zoning laws. The county, under its zoning laws, would make possible these multi-unit developments on the Yakima Reservation. The Yakima zoning regulations would not.

Now the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the applicable zoning for one of the two parcels was tribal because in this case the land of the non-Indian was located in a pristine wilderness-type area that the Court said “retained its Indian character.” In the case of the other parcel, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the county could zone the non-Indians' land because in this area there had been several non-Indians move into a small town on the reservation, and that area had lost its Indian character, having businesses in it and a small airport.

In another case, the 1997 Strate case, which we quoted earlier, a non-Indian contractor was doing work on the Ft. Berthold Indian Reservation. The non-Indian contractor was driving down the road, and Jazella Fredericks came out of her driveway at her home. The truck hit her at a high rate of speed and did serious harm to her. She was in the hospital for many weeks, having been gravely injured.

She and her several children, all members of the tribe, sued. Now Mrs. Fredericks was not a member of the tribe. She had lived on the reservation most of her life, having been a war bride of her husband, Mr. Fredericks, a tribal member. They met in Germany,
and she came directly from her native Germany to the reservation, lived there, raised her children.

When she found that she needed the help of the justice system, she went to the Ft. Berthold justice system, and she was turned back by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that the tribe had no jurisdiction because the accident had taken place on non-Indian land. What was the non-Indian land? It was a road on tribal property over which a right-of-way had been granted to the State to construct the road, non-Indian land.

Now the result would have been different, the Court said, if it was a Federal road or a tribal road, or if Mrs. Fredericks had been a tribal member. Now consider for 1 minute the plight of being a police officer or a zoning official or some other officer of the government for either the tribe or the county or the State in either of these situations. How do you apply the law handed down by this U.S. Supreme Court? It is absolutely impractical and unworkable, depending as it does on tribal membership, race of the parties, and the ownership of land.

Now consider also how all of this must look to a person thinking of putting a business on an Indian reservation or investing in a tribal business. The one thing that a business person wants in my experience is certainty. There is no certainty here, where the law depends on a complex mix of factors that the Court is continuing to articulate, such as race, tribal membership, landownership, and some unarticulated balancing of those factors.

As tribal governments look forward to trying to enhance their economies and fulfill the congressional policy of Indian self-determination and economic growth, these cases are going to be, are today, a major barrier. They are going to drive away businesses. Congress' policy of self-determination for tribes and bolstering tribal governments is being seriously eroded by this course of decision-making.

In the modern era, this period since 1958 until 1986, about when the Rehnquist Court began, the Supreme Court gave modern meaning to those old precedents from the Marshall trilogy, and it sustained tribal powers over tribal territory. During this same period, tribes enacted codes and laws. They strengthened tribal governments and built up agencies and entities to administer their laws over everything from water and the environment to business regulation.

With the help of congressional policy and congressional funding, they strengthened their tribal courts and governments. With new business activity coming in, and it wasn't just bingo parlors and casinos that are known best to the public, the cycle of poverty started to lose its grip on many reservations.

Tribally-controlled schools got new quality and accessibility to education. Now progress, admittedly, has been slow, but it has been steady, and it's been progress, to be sure, thanks to wise and determined tribal leaders, and thanks to the congressional policy of self-determination that's remained unchanged for 30 years. But all of this is now threatened by the devastating impact of these U.S. Supreme Court decisions that deny and reverse congressional policy.
The decisions are filling every gap that Congress has left. If Congress has not addressed an issue, has not spoken, the Court will enter and curb tribal powers. The activism of the Court is resulting in a new and more confused Indian policy with no agenda and no vision beyond its distaste for difference and what it considers to be race-based institutions and a commitment to protecting the powers, prerogatives, and immunities of states. The Court is ruling against tribes in case after case.

The trend in Indian law, indicated by our first chart, is explained by these broader trends that I have identified in the article, but the Court, whether purposefully or not, is advancing a kind of termination. But termination, even wrapped in a black robe, is still termination.

What surely remains of Indian law is Congress’ power to legislate in Indian affairs. Just as Congress has stepped in to correct the error in Duro v. Reina, the case denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-members, Congress can reaffirm and clarify tribal jurisdiction and set Indian law and Indian policy back on track.

Indian rights and Indian sovereignty are essentials in a government-to-government relationship that goes all the way back to the founding of the Nation. If the Court understood this and appreciated this grounding in original intent, Indian law could be put back on track by the Court itself, but this seems unlikely. The Court’s primary mission has little to do with Indian law. It will be up to Congress to reverse the trend. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Getches appears in appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor. May I now call upon Professor Anderson.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT ANDERSON, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SCHOOL OF LAW, SEATTLE, WA

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to be here today.

I want to state for the record that I agree with everything that Professor Getches has so eloquently laid out. He’s done such a good job that he doesn’t leave much for his colleagues to discuss here.

But I have spent about a dozen years working for the American Native Rights Fund, 5 years with Secretary Babbitt at the Interior Department, and I’m now at the University of Washington, where I teach Indian law and run the Native American Law Center, which does a lot of day-to-day work with Indian tribes in the Northwest, Alaska, and around the country. I am also a member of the Bois Forte Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe.

I want to talk to you a little bit about some of the particular instances where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of late has caused real harm to Indian tribes on the ground and also created the significant potential for mischief within the executive branch.

First and foremost is the fact that for years the executive branch, States, and tribes have understood that they operate in a legal world in which Congress has the final say. The foundational principles of Indian law, that tribes have all powers except those expressly taken away, provided a baseline against which tribal leaders, their lawyers, States, and non-Indians could operate. If adjustments needed to be made or experiments were to be undertaken in
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on Indian tribal sovereignty. For most of my professional life I have been involved in Indian law as an attorney, public official, and scholar. For the past several years I have been studying the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Indian law. My biographical information is attached as Appendix A.

For most people, Indian law is an arcane curiosity. But for Indians, it is vitally important to everyday life. The law includes the tools of cultural preservation — and destruction. It makes tribes sovereigns and guarantees insulation of reservation Indians from intrusions by state governments and laws. It also empowers Congress to revise and even extinguish Indian rights and property interests. Indian law defines a body of law that is both cherished and feared by Indians.

Congress has enunciated a policy of Indian self-determination and has repudiated past policies that stripped tribal powers and rights. But today, the Supreme Court is abandoning its enshrined principle of deferring to Congress and is itself re-shaping and diminishing tribal rights and undermining Indian policy. The Court is ignoring the basic principles of Indian law and it appears that only Congress can set Indian law right.

The Foundational Principles in Indian Law Favor Tribal Self-Government

Except as Altered by Congress

Indian law is fraught with heady complexity, but the law concerning tribal governments is founded on a few, very basic principles. They were well-articulated by the late Felix S. Cohen:

The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles:
1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state.
2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its powers of local self-government.
3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.

Embedded in these principles is a continuing, inherent right of tribal self-government. But this right is subject to express limitation by Congress. Sometimes
judicial deference to Congress worked to the disadvantage of tribes, such as when policies destructive of tribal rights and self-government were announced by Congress. In fact, Congress at times has been extreme in divesting Indian rights. Ill-conceived policies such as Allotment and Assimilation in the late 1800s and Termination in the mid-1900s began dismantling tribal governments and land holdings. These two policies were each repudiated by Congress after they proved disastrous for Indian people. But before Congress reversed itself, Indian people challenged the laws implementing these policies. The courts, however, led by the United States Supreme Court refused to alter policy, deferring to Congress.

Likewise, when unique rights of Indian tribes—treaties that afford special fishing rights, immunity from state taxes, governance of hunting by non-Indians on the reservation—have been challenged by others, the Court has said that if these laws result in inequities or represent outmoded policy it is up to Congress to change them. More often than not, though, the decisions affirmed the rights of tribes to the extent they had not been explicitly curtailed by Congress. Relying on foundational principles, the Court typically upheld tribal treaty rights, powers of self-government, and prevented states from imposing their legislation and taxes on Indian reservations.

**From the Nation's Founding Until Recently, the Supreme Court Has Deferred to Congress to Make Indian Policy**

The Court has repeatedly said that in absence of a clear statement by Congress, Indian rights cannot be diminished. The tradition of judicial deference to Congress in Indian affairs has been solidly maintained by the Supreme Court, at least until the last fifteen years. The earliest decisions of the Court found the governmental status of Indian tribes to be grounded firmly in the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. From the days of Chief Justice John Marshall until the mid-1980s, Indian decisions left to Congress the decision whether to alter venerable principles. A trilogy of cases decided by the Marshall Court recognized the independence of tribes and the political relationship between tribes and the United States. These cases were cited in nearly every Indian decision for 150 years and remain as the foundation of Indian law. In case after case, consistent with the foundational principles in Indian law, the Supreme Court sustained tribal rights and powers unless there was a clear indication from Congress that those rights and powers were extinguished. See Appendix B. For instance, in the Modern Era, the Supreme Court:

- Upheld tribal taxes on non-Indian oil development on the Jicarilla Apache reservation
- Allowed the Mescalero Apache Tribe to regulate and license non-Indian hunting and fishing on its reservation
- Denied state jurisdiction to impose income taxes on an Indian employee of a bank on the Navajo Reservation
Rejected a double jeopardy claim when the federal government prosecuted a defendant for a sex offense that had been prosecuted by a tribe, because the tribe is separate sovereign.

Today, however, there has been a sea change in Indian law. The Supreme Court now will deny or diminish tribal powers and rights whenever it does not find explicit congressional affirmation of tribal power. This turns on its head the usual presumption that tribal powers and rights continue in absence of a clear extinguishment by Congress. The Court appears to be resolving the cases consistent with its own subjective policy preferences.

Supreme Court Decisions are Undermining Congressional Policy Favoring Indian Self-Determination

For the Court to interpose its own policy judgments is especially surprising since Congress has adhered to a strong and constant policy of Indian self-determination and economic self-sufficiency for over thirty years. In that period Congress has passed dozens of laws bolstering the authority of tribal governments in Indian country and implementing the prevailing self-determination policy with an impressive body of laws and programs strongly supporting the sovereignty of tribes. These laws provide for Indian control of education and health care, tribal regulation of environmental quality on reservations, and the restoration and consolidation of the tribal land and resource base. Congress has even tried to roll back some of the Supreme Court’s ventures into policymaking that were in conflict with tribal political and cultural autonomy.

Indian Rights and Sovereignty are Being Destroyed

The abrupt shift in Indian law jurisprudence since the mid-1980s has resulted in a dramatic record of damaging results for Indian tribes. The record is revealing in terms of wins and losses. In the last ten terms, Indian tribal interests have lost 77% of all their cases in the Supreme Court. It is difficult to find another class of cases or type of litigant that has fared worse in the Supreme Court. Indeed, even criminals seeking reversals of their convictions succeeded 36% of the time in the Rehnquist Court compared to the tribes’ 23% success rate!

The consequences of the tribes’ dismal record before the Court are serious. Since 1986 tribes have lost 70% of all jurisdiction cases. The Court has rejected nearly all attempts to extend tribal law over non-Indians on Indian reservations. Its decisions have prevented tribes from trying and punishing non-Indian criminal defendants, from regulating nonmembers’ fishing and hunting on non-Indian land, from zoning nonmember land in communities on the reservation populated by large numbers of whites, from taxing non-Indian hotel guests on the reservation when the hotel is on non-Indian land, from hearing personal injury lawsuits between non-Indians for accidents on non-Indian land within the reservation, and from hearing suits brought by tribal members for torts committed against them on tribal land by non-Indian state officials. Even in cases concerning state jurisdiction over Indians on the reservation, tribes have lost a majority of the time and the Court has allowed state tax collection and regulation of Indians on their own reservations.
These decisions create practical problems. The Court’s increasingly complicated jurisdictional rules depend on multiple factors such as the race and tribal membership of parties and ownership of individual parcels of land. This seriously complicates the work of police, courts, and administrators, whether they are employed by tribes or by non-Indian local or state governments.

Consider the result in *Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.* The Court divided zoning authority over nonmembers’ land within different parts of the Yakima Reservation between the tribe and the county based on whether non-Indians owned an unspecified percentage of land in a portion of the reservation. Besides the grave implications for tribal sovereignty, it is nearly impossible for tribal and county officials—not to mention property owners—to apply the decision rationally on the Yakima and other reservations. Zoning jurisdiction based on property ownership not only creates practical problems but also can undermine land use planning objectives because the success of zoning laws depends on comprehensive planning over a substantial area.

The Court created a similarly impractical jurisdictional rule when it said tribal courts did not have jurisdiction over a lawsuit for personal injuries caused by non-Indians on the reservation if they occurred on many (but not all) roads on reservations. The recent *Hicks* case left reservation Indians at the mercy of non-Indian law enforcement officers when it held that state game wardens were immune from tribal jurisdiction even when they invaded an Indian home on tribal land and allegedly damaged property of the Indian resident. And the *Venetie* decision declared that tribal governments lacked jurisdiction over hundreds of remote Alaska Native villages, leaving the residents with little available law enforcement or government regulation.

The Rehnquist Court’s decisions, meanderings from the settled principles and approaches embraced by all its predecessors, have created a judicial atmosphere that threatens economic development efforts as well as the political and cultural survival of Indian tribes. This inevitably causes confusion among state, local, and tribal governments, heightens tensions among Indians and their non-Indian neighbors, undermines reservation economic development efforts, and frustrates lower federal and state courts. Investors and businesses seek certainty and the jurisdictional situation created by the present Court has made the provision of government services and the regulatory situation unacceptably ambiguous. Thus, the recent decisions have begun to dismantle Indian policy.

It is ironic that, in an era when many tribes have gained the greater respect and competence needed to deal effectively in the political arena, and when Congress has made clear a strong policy of Indian self-determination, that the Court should, for the first time in the nation’s history, assume the prerogative of altering Indian policy instead of deferring to Congress.

**Congress Should Provide Guidance to the Court and Rectify its Misadventures in Indian Law**

Indian policy-making belongs in Congress, not in the courts. Nothing the Court has said has questioned the continuing existence of Congress’s plenary power in Indian affairs. Not only is it consistent with the constitutional separation of powers for Congress to articulate Indian policy regarding tribal powers, but the legislative process also has an.
advantage over adjudication. Congress can frame policy that looks beyond a single fact situation. Unlike a judge, who must decide an issue based on whatever record was assembled below, Congress can focus broadly on the issues it addresses and base its ultimate decision on a full consideration of all the implications of the policies and programs it develops.

Although Indians have not always fared well in Congress, American Indian policy, based on a commitment to promoting tribal self-determination, has been rather constant for many years. In part this is because tribes now participate fully in the legislative process.

My research has concluded that, rather than having a specific “Indian agenda,” the Rehnquist Court is pursuing certain strongly held values that underlie its larger agenda. That agenda seeks to strengthen states’ rights, to insist on color-blind justice, and to advance mainstream values. These three themes dominate virtually all of the Court’s work in every field. The Court seems to view Indian law cases as being at odds with these values— involving attacks on state rights, claims of racial preferences, and practices or rights that depart from or disrupt mainstream values. Moreover, it appears that some of the recent Indian cases were selected by the Court because they presented a fact situation in which it could tackle an issue like state sovereign immunity or limits on the free exercise of religion, and the cases just happened to involve Indians.

The Justices’ values concerning broader issues in society have informed their views on the merits of Indian cases that, in another era, would be seen as uniquely Indian law matters. When Indian rights and tribal sovereignty are cast as separatist battles that undermine state jurisdiction for the sake of smoke shops and gambling enterprises, they are not viewed favorably by this Court. More appropriately, Indian rights should be seen for what they are, and historically have been: the fulfillment of a political relationship between the United States and self-governing tribes.

The Rehnquist Court has shown that it does not view tribal sovereignty either in a historical context—as part of the arrangements a superior power has made with indigenous sovereigns to secure peace and access to most of the land on the continent—or as an instrument to achieve the current Indian policy goals of economic and political independence set by Congress.

Congress could legislate to reaffirm the self-determination policies and longstanding principles of Indian law that support tribal sovereignty. This would provide guidance to the courts for their decision of Indian law cases. Doing so might return the Court to a more thoughtful consideration of Indian law as a distinct field with its own doctrines and traditions rooted in the nation’s history and Constitution.

3. The term “modern era” for that period was coined by Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law (1987). All Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court from the modern era through the 2000-2001 Term of the Court are cited and described in Appendix B.


15. My study of Indian law in the Supreme Court showed that from 1986-2001, the Court decided forty Indian law cases of which tribal interests won only nine, or 23%. This covers the fifteen terms of the Court since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice and can be compared to the seventeen terms of the predecessor Burger Court when tribal interests prevailed in 58% of the cases. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 280-81 (2001).


"abrogated the Tribe’s ‘absolute and undisturbed use and occupation’ [of certain lands] and thereby deprived the Tribe of the power to license non-Indian use of the lands”).

Appendix A

David H. Getches
Biographical Information

David Getches is the Raphael J. Moses Professor of Natural Resources Law at the University of Colorado School of Law. He teaches and writes on Indian law, water law, public land law, and environmental law. Professor Getches has published several books on Indian law and water law including Federal Indian Law, with Wilkinson and Williams (1998). He has written many articles and book chapters that appear in diverse scholarly and popular sources, including recent articles analyzing the Supreme Court’s departures from traditional principles in Indian law.

Mr. Getches was the first attorney in the Southern California office of California Indian Legal Services, which he opened in 1969. He was the founding Executive Director of the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) where he developed the staff, funding, and program of this national, nonprofit Indian-interest law firm. Major cases he litigated include a Northwest Indian fishing rights case (United States v. Washington, known locally as “the Boldt decision”) and a case on behalf of Eskimos to establish the North Slope Borough, the largest municipality in the world, which includes the Prudhoe Bay oil fields. His other cases dealt with water rights, land claims, federal trust responsibilities, environmental issues, education, and civil rights on behalf of Native American clients throughout the West.

In 1983, David Getches was appointed Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources by Governor Richard D. Lamm. The department includes ten divisions of state government that deal with parks, wildlife, land, water, and minerals. During his three and one-half years in that post he strongly advocated water conservation, pressed for groundwater law reform, advanced ideas for better cooperative management and control of the Colorado River, urged expansion of the state’s wilderness areas, and spoke out on the importance of recreation and wildlife to the state’s economy.

Professor Getches has consulted widely with governmental agencies, Indian tribes, and non-governmental organizations throughout the United States and in several foreign countries. He is a graduate of Occidental College and the University of Southern California Law School.
Appendix B

Supreme Court Cases in Indian Law: 1958-2000
(decided on the merits with opinion)
David H. Getches*

1958 Term
1. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), upholding exclusive tribal judicial jurisdiction over actions involving contracts entered into on an Indian reservation between a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant.

1959 Term

1960 Term
3. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), upholding exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over prosecutions for offenses covered by the Major Crimes Act that are committed by an Indian on lands held in fee patent by a non-Indian within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation.
4. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962), upholding the secretary of the interior’s authority to license the manner in which the Metlakatla Indians fish on lands reserved for the use of the tribe by the Act of March 3, 1891.
5. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), striking down the authority of the secretary of the interior to authorize fishing by Thlinget Indians, for whom no reservation had been set aside, in a manner contrary to state law.

1962 Term
6. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), upholding the authority of the United States to reserve water rights for Indian reservations originally established by executive order; defining the quantity of water reserved for Indian reservations as being enough water to satisfy the future, as well as present, needs of the reservations, including enough water to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations.

1964 Term

1965 Term
8. Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 269 (1965), ordering the secretary of the interior and states of Arizona, California, and Nevada to furnish the Court with a list of their present perfected

* Through the 1985 Term of the Court is based on the virtually identical compilation in Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law 123-132 (1987). The rest of the list was compiled by David H. Getches.
rights (including Indian reserved rights) and claimed priority dates to waters in the Colorado River.

1967 Term
9. Poafpybitly v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968), upholding an Indian landowner's standing to sue to enforce an oil and gas lease, approved by the secretary of the interior, for use on land held by the Indian under a trust patent.

10. Peoria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 390 U.S. 468 (1968), holding the United States liable for the investment that would have been earned on the proceeds from the sale of lands ceded by the tribe had those lands been sold at their public auction value, as required by the Treaty of May 30, 1854.


12. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968), upholding the state's authority to regulate the manner in which a tribe exercises its off-reservation treaty fishing rights where such regulations are reasonable and necessary to conserve fish and wildlife resources and are nondiscriminatory.

1968 Term
13. Makah Indian Tribe v. Tax Comm'n, 393 U.S. 8 (1968) (per curiam), dismissing, for lack of a substantial federal question, the tribe's appeal of the Washington Supreme Court's holding that application of a state cigarette tax to wholesalers who distribute cigarettes to retailers doing business on the reservation did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., art. III, § 8, cl. 3.

1969 Term
14. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), striking down the secretary of the interior's authority to disapprove an Indian's testamentary disposition of trust property on the secretary's subjective belief that the disposition is not "just and equitable."


1970 Term
16. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), striking down asserted state judicial jurisdiction over civil contract actions brought by a non-Indian against an Indian concerning a transaction occurring on the reservation.


1971 Term
18. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), upholding the termination of the federal government's supervision of trust property held by individual mixed-blood Utes after the secretary of the interior's issuance of a termination proclamation.
1972 Term
19. United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972), upholding Congress’s authority to redistribute mineral royalties generated by tribal lands to a larger class of Indian beneficiaries without incurring a Fifth Amendment obligation to compensate the original, smaller class of Indian beneficiaries.
20. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), upholding the imposition of a state gross receipts tax on income earned from a tribal business conducted on off-reservation lands where the tax does not discriminate against Indians.
22. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), construing the Major Crimes Act as entitling Indian criminal defendants to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense that is not an offense enumerated in the act.
23. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973), upholding a federal administrator’s authority to rely on prior Supreme Court cases that the Court has not later overruled or questioned in discharging the government’s fiduciary obligations to Indians.
24. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), upholding the continued existence of the Klamath River Reservation despite the Act of June 17, 1892, which opened the lands within the reservation to settlement under the homestead laws.

1973 Term
25. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973), striking down, as discriminatory against Indians, a state regulation that completely banned net fishing for steelhead trout.
26. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), upholding federal judicial jurisdiction over an action brought by a tribe claiming that political subdivisions of the state were interfering with the tribe’s possessory rights to aboriginal lands.

1974 Term
29. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), upholding Congress’s authority to delegate to tribal governments the authority to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages on a reservation.
30. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), upholding Congress’s authority to enact legislation limiting a state’s power to regulate tribal hunting and fishing rights on lands ceded by the tribe.
31. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), construing the Act of March 3, 1891, as having disestablished the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation.
Federal Power Commission to issue licenses for the construction of thermal-electric power plants.

1975 Term
33. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam), upholding exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding where all of the parties to the proceeding were members of the tribe and resided on the reservation.
34. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), upholding the dismissal of an action brought by the United States in federal court to adjudicate federal and Indian reserved water rights when there is a concurrent adjudication of the same issues in state court.
35. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), striking down the imposition of a state cigarette tax on on-reservation sales by Indians to Indians; upholding the imposition of a state cigarette tax on on-reservation sales by Indians to non-Indians.
36. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976), upholding the authority of Congress to transfer mineral rights from individual Indian allottees to their tribe without compensation where the act authorizing allotment of tribal lands severed the mineral and surface estates.

1976 Term
40. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), upholding the first degree murder conviction of an Indian under the Major Crimes Act where the conviction of a non-Indian for the same offense in state court would have placed a higher burden of proof upon the state.
41. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), upholding the state's authority to regulate the tribe's on-reservation treaty fishing rights when such regulations are reasonable and necessary for the conservation of fish.

1977 Term
44. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), holding the writ of habeas corpus to be the exclusive remedy available for alleged violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
45. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978), striking down state jurisdiction over the prosecution of an Indian for an offense included in the Major Crimes Act and committed on lands purchased for the Mississippi Choctaws, a remnant band of the Choctaw Tribe.
1978 Term
48. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), upholding the Pacific Northwest tribes' treaty right to take up to 50 percent of the harvestable fish passing through the tribes' usual and accustomed fishing places.

1979 Term
50. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), construing the General Allotment Act as creating only a limited trust relationship that does not impose a fiduciary obligation on the United States to manage the allottees' timber resources properly.
52. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), upholding the imposition of state cigarette and sales taxes on on-reservation sales by a tribe to non-members of the tribe.
53. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), striking down the imposition of state motor carrier license and fuel use taxes on a non-Indian corporation engaged in logging activities on a reservation pursuant to a contract with the tribe.
54. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), striking down the imposition of a state gross receipts tax on on-reservation sales by a non-Indian to a tribe, where the non-Indian seller is not licensed to trade with Indians and has no permanent place of business on the reservation.

1980 Term

1981 Term
57. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), upholding the tribe's authority to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production on reservation land.
1982 Term
59. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), barring, on the basis of finality, an increase in tribes' water rights based on additions to the tribes' practicably irrigable acreage, except as to lands judicially determined to have extended the reservation boundaries.
60. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), upholding exclusive tribal regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by members and nonmembers within the reservation.
61. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), barring, on the basis of res judicata, the tribe's assertion of a reserved water right to maintain Pyramid Lake.
63. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), upholding the dismissal of an action brought in federal court by an Indian tribe to adjudicate its reserved water rights when there is a concurrent adjudication of the same issue in state court.

1983 Term
65. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), construing the Cheyenne River Act as having opened a portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation to settlement by non-Indians, but as not having disestablished the opened lands from the reservation.
66. Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984), upholding the authority of the secretary of interior to impose mandatory conditions on Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses for construction, operation, and maintenance of hydroelectric project works located on Indian reservations; finding that Indian reserved water rights are not protected reservations within the meaning of the Federal Power Act.
67. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984), upholding concurrent tribal and state judicial jurisdiction over actions brought by an Indian tribe against a non-Indian defendant for claims arising in Indian country.

1984 Term
68. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985), holding that the Shoshone Tribe's aboriginal title to lands in several western states was extinguished when, pursuant to a judgment awarded the tribe by the Indian Claims Commission, the United States placed $26 million in an interest-bearing trust account for the tribe.
69. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), upholding the tribe's federal common law right of action for a violation of its possessory rights to aboriginal lands that occurred in 1795.
70. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), upholding the authority of a non-IRA tribe to impose possessory interest and business activity taxes on mineral production within the reservation without the approval of the secretary of interior.

73. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985), construing § 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 as authorizing the conveyance of the nineteen New Mexico Pueblos’ land upon the approval of the secretary of the interior.

74. Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985), upholding the authority of the state to regulate tribal members’ hunting and fishing on former tribal lands ceded by the tribe in 1901.

1985 Term

75. California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9 (1985) (per curiam), upholding the authority of the state to require the tribe to collect an excise tax on tribal cigarette sales to non-Indians where the incidence of the tax falls upon the purchasers.

76. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986), holding that the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act of 1959 requires the application of the state statute of limitations to the tribe’s land claim.

77. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), holding that the right of Indian parents to exercise their religion under the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by the government’s use of their child’s Social Security number.

78. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), holding that Congress, in the Eagle Protection Act, set out a clear and plain intent to abrogate the treaty rights of Indians to hunt eagles.

79. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834 (1986), holding that a suit against the United States by an Indian, claiming that the sale of her allotment interests was void, was barred by the 12-year statute of limitations period of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409a (1982).


1986 Term

81. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), holding that tribal courts have jurisdiction over nonmember activities in Indian country unless jurisdiction is limited by explicit treaty or statutory language.

82. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), holding that a tribe in a Public Law 280 state is not subject to state laws that regulate specific types of gambling.

1987 Term

83. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), holding that the federal government was not prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause from logging and construction on National Forest lands used by tribes for religious purposes, even though the activities could have devastating effects on Indian religious practices.

1988 Term

84. Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), holding that tribal members who used peyote for religious purposes could be denied...
state unemployment compensation benefits if the state prohibited peyote use and this prohibition was not unconstitutional.


86. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), holding that exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings where the child is domiciled on a reservation is given to the tribe under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

87. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), holding that a state severance tax on a non-Indian minerals company, that was operating on reservation lands, was not preempted by federal law or the imposition of a tribal tax.

88. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), holding that the tribe had jurisdiction to zone nonmember fee lands on the reservation that were not open to the public, but the county had jurisdiction to zone nonmember lands in the open portion of the reservation.

1989 Term
89. Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), holding that a tribal member was not excused under the Free Exercise clause for violation of state peyote laws that represented generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct.

90. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), holding that the tribe could not assert jurisdiction over non-member Indians for crimes committed on the reservation.

1990 Term
91. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), holding that the tribe had not waived its sovereign immunity to suit by the state, when it sought an injunction to prevent state taxation of cigarette sales to tribal members, but that sovereign immunity did not prevent the state from taxing sales to nonmembers on allotted lands.


1991 Term
93. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), holding that the county could impose an ad valorem property tax on Indian-owned lands within the reservation that had been patented in fee under the General Allotment Act.

1992 Term
94. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993), holding that federal jurisdiction over crimes covered by the Major Crimes Act was not exclusive and did not prevent the state from prosecuting the same conduct, if it also violated state law.
95. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), holding that the state was preempted from imposing income or motor vehicle taxes on tribal members who lived within Indian Country.

96. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993), holding that the Indian Health Services did not need to conduct notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act before discontinuing mental health services to handicapped Indian children.


1993 Term

98. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), holding that Congress intended that surplus land acts would diminish the reservation, based on the circumstances surrounding passage of the acts and current demographics showing a high population of non-Indians on the land.


1994 Term

100. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), holding that the state may impose income tax on tribal members who live outside of the reservation but who are employed by the tribe on the reservation.

1995 Term

101. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit by enacting legislation under the Indian Commerce Clause that allowed tribes to sue states for failure to negotiate gaming complaints in good faith.

1996 Term


103. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), holding that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over a civil case between tribal nonmembers, which was based on a traffic accident that occurred on a state highway over a reservation right-of-way.

104. Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), holding that the tribe was barred from suing state of officials under the Ex Parte Young doctrine because their suit was the equivalent of a quiet title action and could extinguish state control over the land.

1997 Term

105. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), holding that the statutory language of the surplus land act combined with the commitment by the U.S. to pay for ceded lands, served to diminish the reservation, and thus the tribe lacked jurisdiction over non-Indian land.
106. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), holding that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to tax non-Indian property in native villages, which was not a "dependent Indian community" defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, because lands were not set aside for the use of Indians under the superintendence of the federal government.

107. Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), holding that the tribe was not entitled to the proceeds of state taxes that were collected in violation of federal law, because that state could have lawfully collected some of the taxes and it was unfair to allow the tribe to have them all.

108. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998), holding that a tribe is protected from suit under the sovereign immunity doctrine, even for off-reservation activities, unless Congress authorized the suit or the tribe waived its immunity.

109. Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998), holding that alienable lands that had been repurchased by the tribe were subject to state and local taxation unless they were restored to federal trust protection under the Indian Reorganization Act.

1998 Term

110. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), holding that a state may tax a private company for on-reservation work based on its contract with the BIA, if the legal incidence of the tax falls on the private company, and Congress does not expressly preempt the contract from taxation.


112. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999), holding that the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion does not apply in a case under the Price-Anderson Act, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal.

113. Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999), rejecting tribe's claim that coal owned by tribe under former reservation lands the surface of which patented to settlers, but subject to a reservation of the "coal," included valuable coalbed methane gas.

1999 Term

114. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), rejecting Hawaii's voting scheme that limits the election of trustees who administer funds for Native Hawaiians to ancestral descendents of Native Hawaiians, as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.


2000 Term


117. Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association, 532 U.S. 1 (2001), holding that communications between tribe and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials
and attorneys were subject to disclosure under a Freedom of Information Act request by adverse party in water rights litigation whether or not they were discoverable because the communications were not intra- or inter-agency.

118. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), holding that nonmembers of tribe were not subject to tribe’s hotel occupancy tax where hotel was located on parcel of non-Indian land within reservation because there were no consensual relations between the hotel owners or guests and the tribe and hotel operations did not affect political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of tribe.

119. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001), affirming finding that tribe retained title to bed of lake within reservation where evidence showed Congress intended that submerged land not pass to state on statehood without tribal consent, based on continuous pre-statehood understanding that the lands and related water rights were important to tribe.

120. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) holding that tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate tort and civil rights claims by tribal member against state game warden sued in his individual capacity for allegedly exceeding the scope of a state warrant to search the Indian’s home on tribal land within a reservation that had been validated by the tribal court, because of state’s interest in asserting its jurisdiction over Indians.
Indian Decisions: For and Against Tribal Interests
Burger and Rehnquist Courts

Burger Court - 1969-1985 Terms

- 41.8% For
- 58.2% Against

Rehnquist Court - 1986-2000 Terms

- 22.5% For
- 77.5% Against

% For Ind. % Ag. Ind.
Indians in the Rehnquist Court

*Indians won only 23% of the time*
(includes as appellant or respondent)

*Convicted criminals won 34% of the time*
(reversals of convictions)
Foundational Principles:

- Tribes are sovereigns
- Tribes became subject to legislative power of US and lost external sovereignty
- Retained tribal powers can only be qualified by congressional legislation or treaties

Source: Marshall Trilogy
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY:

"Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions hereinafter analyzed, is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."

-- Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1942
Tribal Powers

Modern Era:

"Until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers."

UNITED STATES v. WHEELER (1978)

Rehnquist Court:

"Our case law establishes that, absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of non-members exists only in limited circumstances."

Tribal Sovereignty

Modern Era:

"Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose."


Rehnquist Court:

"Only full territorial sovereigns enjoy the 'power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens,' and Indian tribes 'can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.'"

Tribal Courts

Modern Era:
"Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over [nonmember] activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."

Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Laplante (1987)

Rehnquist Court:
"Limiting tribal court jurisdiction . . . fits with historical assumptions about tribal authority and serves sound policy . . . [A] presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant . . ."

Nevada v. Hicks (2001) (Souter, concurring)
Congressional Intent

- Modern Era
  “Present federal policy seems to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government...[and] courts ‘are not obligated in ambiguous circumstances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship.”

- Rehnquist Court:
  “It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government.”


Bryan v. Itasca County (1976)
TRENDS IN THE REHNQUIST COURT'S DECISIONS:

- Claims of Racial Minorities Disfavored
- Interests of States Upheld
- Mainstream Values Favored
Indians in the Rehnquist Court

State Jurisdiction over Indians

Rehnquist Court (12 years) 82% favoring states
Burger Court (last 12 years) 45% favoring states

Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians

Rehnquist Court (12 years) 25% favoring Indians
Burger Court (12 years) 80% favoring Indians
States in the Rehnquist Court

States as Petitioners: 93% reversed
(lost below)

States as Respondents: 47% reversed
(won below)

(All cases in USSC 62% reversed)